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On the Origin of Interoception
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Over the course of a century, the meaning of interoception has changed from the
restrictive to the inclusive. In its inclusive sense, it bears relevance to every individual
via its link to emotion, decision making, time-perception, health, pain, and various other
areas of life. While the label for the perception of the body state changes over time,
the need for an overarching concept remains. Many aspects can make any particular
interoceptive sensation unique and distinct from any other interoceptive sensation.
This can range from the sense of agency, to the physical cause of a sensation, the
ontogenetic origin, the efferent innervation, and afferent pathways of the tissue involved
amongst others. In its overarching meaning, interoception primarily is a product of the
central nervous system, a construct based on an integration of various sources, not
per se including afferent information. This paper proposes a definition of interoception
as based on subjective experience, and pleas for the use of specific vocabulary in
addressing the many aspects that contribute to it.
Keywords: interoception conceptualization, body state perception, phenomenological experience, cross-modal
integration, subjective experience
INTRODUCTION
While interoception is a term that has gained and still is gaining popularity in the academic
literature since the start of the millennium, consensus on its meaning is as yet not fully established.
What is generally agreed upon by most current scholars is that interoception is the perception
of the state of the body. The exact interpretation of this definition ranges from the original
restrictive meaning which is still adhered to by some (e.g., Dworkin, 2007) to the now more
commonly used very inclusive meaning (e.g., Craig, 2002; Wiens, 2005). The restrictive meaning
holds that only sensations stemming from viscera are interoceptive. However, throughout this
review interoception is used in the inclusive sense; as an umbrella term for the phenomenological
experience of the body state, an experience which is ultimately a product of the central nervous
system (CNS), regardless of what information the brain uses and does not use to construct
this experience. Arguments supporting this choice will be addressed and elaborated upon later
throughout di erent parts of this review.
The relevance of interoception in its inclusive meaning will be illustrated by briefly highlighting
its range of involvement across a spectrum of di erent areas of psychology and health. Next, the
importance of proper communication on interoception will be stressed, regardless of the definition
one has. The original meaning of interoception will be examined and a short overview of the
linguistic development of interoception and related concepts over time will be provided. Finally, an
impetus will be given for applying a clear vocabulary that allows to distinguish between the various
aspects which can contribute to interoception, while retaining the use of an overarching term. This
review will end with some concluding remarks.
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Scope of Relevance
While not yet common parlance in medical circles,
“interoception” is a concept which relates to a very wide
range of health related and psychological aspects of human
life, playing a role in every individual. As a consequence,
interoception is of pivotal importance to a wide range of
research, theory and translational applications of research
findings. A cursory glance at the literature is su cient to see
that interoception relates to a vast range of subjects. These
subjects include pain (Craig, 2003), medically unexplained
symptoms (MUSs; Bogaerts et al., 2010; Schaefer et al., 2012)
as well as medically identifiable symptoms (Julius et al., 2002;
Mandelzweig et al., 2006; Janssens, 2011), negative emotions
(Pollatos et al., 2007); anxiety, anxiety disorders, and a ective
disorders (Barlow et al., 2004; Domschke et al., 2010; Dunn et al.,
2010b; Paulus and Stein, 2010; Stern, 2014), emotions in general
(James, 1884; Lange, 1885; Schachter and Singer, 1962; Damasio,
1994; Wiens, 2005; Craig, 2008; Zaki et al., 2012; Damasio
and Carvalho, 2013), emotion regulation (Füstös et al., 2012),
decision making (Damasio, 1994; Bechara et al., 1997; Paulus,
2007; Clark et al., 2008; Dunn et al., 2010a, 2012; Paulus, 2011),
subjective time perception (Craig, 2009; Pollatos et al., 2014),
subjective (self)awareness and consciousness (Craig, 2004; Seth
et al., 2011), food and water intake (Berthoud, 2006; Herbert
et al., 2012a; Brannigan et al., 2014), eating disorders (Pollatos
et al., 2008; Herbert and Pollatos, 2014), addiction (Paulus et al.,
2009; Naqvi and Bechara, 2010; Verdejo-Garcia et al., 2012),
sexual functioning (Everaerd et al., 2006; Gerbarg and Brown,
2011), empathy (Singer et al., 2009; Fukushima et al., 2011),
meditation (Farb et al., 2012), hypnosis (Woody and Szechtman,
2007), and of course interoceptive conditioning (Razran, 1961;
Pappens et al., 2013).
Although this list is unlikely to be exhaustive, and though it
is beyond the scope of this review to specify for each of these
subjects how they relate to interoception, it should be clear that
interoception is not to be considered a minor field of study
within psychology and health, and that its study has widespread
relevance. The focus of this review is to address the semantics of
interoception.
Interoceptive Conditioning
Classical and operant conditioning are worth further elaboration,
as this spearheaded research on interoception. Ivan Pavlov is
most known for first describing conditioning on dogs who
learned to salivate in response to the sound of a bell [conditioned
stimulus (CS)], after they had learned that the bell predicted
food [unconditioned stimulus (US)] would come. It is also Pavlov
who emphasized that not only exogenous stimuli such as the
bell, but also endogenous events, i.e., changes in the ‘milieu
interieur,’ could serve as CS (Pavlov, 1927). This idea formed the
basis for what is termed interoceptive conditioning: conditioning
where either the CS, the US, or both are subjectively perceived
as informative of the body state (Razran, 1961). Interoceptive
conditioning has been hypothesized to be of importance in
the etiology, maintenance and treatment of chronic pain (De
Peuter et al., 2011), functional disorders, cancer related fatigue
(Meagher, 2010), hypertension (Koroboki et al., 2010), eating
disorders (Davidson, 1993; Oldershaw et al., 2011), mood and
anxiety disorders (Paulus and Stein, 2010; Deacon et al., 2013),
and drug addiction (Wise et al., 2008; Bevins and Murray, 2011;
Bevins and Besheer, 2014; Troisi, 2014).
Studies on the role of interoceptive conditioning in drug
addiction provide a useful paradigm for evaluating interoceptive
conditioning. Moreover, they provide a paradigm for assessing
subjective perception of changes in body state, i.e., interoception.
For example, Lubinski and Thompson (1987) describe how two
pigeons were conditioned to e ectively communicate to each
other and three other pigeons whether they were experiencing
the e ects of a stimulant (cocaine), a depressant (pentobarbital),
or no drug (saline). Learning to recognize and communicate
these di erent drug induced body states, generalized to the
ability to e ectively communicate states induced by another
stimulant (d-amphetamine) and depressant (chlordiazepoxide)
without need for further training. Likewise, rats can be trained to
discriminate drug e ects of nicotine from a non-drug state. This
learned discrimination can serve to alter their behavior (lever
pressing), help to establish the median e ective dose necessary
for receptor signals to become perceptible, and provides a
model for drug use and drug craving. The aforementioned drug
discrimination paradigms have demonstrated that it is possible
to qualitatively and quantitatively manipulate the subjective
body state, and that this altered subjective state due to drugs
can serve as CS (Bevins and Besheer, 2014), or rather as
an operant discriminative stimulus (Troisi, 2014). Thus, drug
discrimination and state dependent learning are forms of
interoceptive conditioning. The importance of interoceptive
conditioning for a variety of widespread conditions mentioned
in the previous paragraph, as well as a useful paradigm for
researching interoception, further underscores there is a demand
for a clear definition of interoception and related terminology
that allows for subtle, but critical distinctions within this larger
function based concept.
Pain and Interoception
Also among the list of subjects related to interoception (see
Scope of Relevance), the subject of pain deserves special mention.
The International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP)
defines pain as “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience
associated with actual or potential tissue damage, or described
in terms of such damage” (Merskey, 1986). While those with a
narrow definition of interoception would only consider visceral
pain interoceptive, those with more inclusive definitions of
interoception such as the one used throughout this review –
consider all forms of pain as a form of interoception. This
inclusive approach is supported by functional neuroimaging
studies which find that the neural network activated during pain
and during other forms of interoception are very much the same
(Legrain et al., 2011; Moseley et al., 2012). It is also indirectly
supported by the well-validated finding that emotion plays a
significant role in pain; a role which it also plays in all other
forms of interoception. For example, negative emotions impact
the a ective component of pain negatively and decrease pain
tolerance (Carter et al., 2002), while positive emotion increases
pain tolerance (Zweyer et al., 2004). In dyspnea one can observe
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something remarkably similar. In a negative a ective context,
dyspnea elicits more respiratory symptom report than in a
positive a ective context (von Leupoldt and Dahme, 2013). This
parallel between pain and dyspnea can be taken as an additional
indication that pain really is nothing more than a specific form
of interoception, but interoception nevertheless. Regardless of
which definition of interoception one applies, the inclusion of
pain in the definition of interoception -even if merely including
visceral pain- has its merit. It provides a fertile soil for cross-
fertilization of ideas from the vast area of pain research on the one
hand, and that of research on non-painful types of interoception
on the other.
Communicating on Interoception
It is surprising that communication around the concept
interoception often stumbles over definitional di erences
between authors. While both an overarching concept of body
perception as well as more specific concepts deserve their
own place, the exclusive focus on one approach could lead
to undervalue the importance of the other. For example, an
overarching concept has as one advantage that it crosses the
bridges between di erent types of research findings. How this
overarching concept is labeled, changes over time as do so
many aspects of language. In the 19th century this overarching
concept was referred to as “coenaesthesis,” in the early 20th
century “coenesthesia,” in the second half of the 20th century
“somesthesis,” and now in the 21st century it is most frequently
referred to as “interoception” (see Semantic Evolution).
Regardless of its label, an exclusive focus on an umbrella term
may lead to premature overgeneralization of findings.
For example, the accuracy with which to detect heartbeats
has long been referred to as a general measure of overall
interoceptive accuracy. It is true that interoception includes the
ability to perceive heartbeats. However, prior to having tested
how accuracy with which to detect heartbeats correlates with
accuracy of perception of the heterogeneous plethora of other
types of interoceptive sensations, it would be premature to say
that all forms of interoceptive accuracy are poor in those who
have poor accuracy in perceiving their own heartbeat – even
if this hunch later appears to be correct. Such a conclusion
would remain premature until the point where there are
actual findings which support the conclusion that heartbeat
accuracy can be generalized to reflect accuracy of perception
of other interoceptive sensations. This caution has also been
emphasized by the authors previously (Ceunen et al., 2013a).
After submission of the letter to the editor cautioning against
premature generalization, Herbert et al. (2012b) published a
research article which does suggest that accurate cardioceptive
perceivers also have more accurate perception of sensations that
aid in the regulation of water intake. Findings like these allow
to gradually make evidence-based extrapolations, and stimulate
speculations on how generalizable findings are. At the same time,
we need to remain careful not to overgeneralize beyond what has
been investigated, nor to blindly accept extrapolations suggested
by others as facts.
Arguments referring to neuroanatomy are sometimes used to
justify generalizations such as cautioned against in the previous
paragraph. One example of such a generalization is referring
to the convergence of sensory information from distinct bodily
organs and of distinct types of visceroceptors in the nucleus
of the solitary tract (NTS). Though processed in very close
proximity to each other within the NTS and sometimes in
overlapping areas, the respective loci in the NTS necessary
for each of these sensations are still somewhat distinct (Paton
et al., 1999). Also, convergence at one site of processing does
not necessarily mean that at all other levels of processing
there is not a single distinction between any of these distinct
body state sensations. Therefore, to prevent oneself from being
tempted into premature generalization, it is useful to keep in
mind that di erent sensations not only overlap in some aspects
(e.g., all being interoceptive and activating a largely common
neural network), but are also unique in their own ways. This
uniqueness of sensations holds true even if all these sensations
have in common that they refer to the body state and have
at least one or more common processing sites in the brain.
Examples of levels at which sensations can be considered as
being distinct from one another can be: whether sensations
are entoperipheral or epiperipheral in origin; whether they
are exogenous or endogenous; whether the individual does
or does not experience a sense of agency over what causes
these sensations; whether the sensations stem from tissues with
e erent autonomic nervous system (ANS) and enteric nervous
system (ENS) or from somatic nervous system (SNS) innervation;
whether the concerned organs are identical or di erent in their
ontogenetic origin as coming from ectoderm, endoderm, or
mesoderm; and which a erent homeostatic pathways and basal
processing structures are involved in the early processing. I
will go into more detail on a number of these in separate
sections later on (see Exogenous versus Endogenous Origins;
Visceroceptor, Visceroceptive, Visceroception – A Reference to
E erent Innervation; The Homeostatic A erent Pathways and
Early CNS Processing of Homeostasis). The main point is that,
even though there may be commonalities between di erent body
state sensations, there are also always di erences. Interoceptive
sensations are characterized by both specificity and convergence.
Though an overarching term can be beneficial, this all goes
to emphasize that we should always keep in mind to avoid
premature generalization that has not first been specifically
addressed in research.
On the other end of the spectrum, as opposed to the exclusive
focus on an overarching concept and an exclusive focus on
similarities, there can be an exclusive restrictive focus on one
of the subcomponents of interoception; on what makes this
subcomponent di erent from other sensations. Just as the broad
focus on similarities, so too does the narrow focus on di erences
have its own advantages and disadvantages. An advantage of
research with a narrow focus is that this will provide specific
information on a subcomponent of interoception, which can
then be contrasted to other subcomponents of interoception,
which allows us to make statements on the generalizability or
specificity of these and other findings. A disadvantage of a more
narrow focus is that at times, findings from certain research
areas do not provide, nor receive input from distinct yet related
research areas. As a result the information from di erent types of
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studies is less likely to be put together to form a more complete
picture.
To allow for better communication of not only findings,
but also for cross-fertilization in the sharing and forming of
ideas and insights on interoception, and on its relation to
human psychological faculties and health related issues, there
needs to be a common understanding amongst researchers. To
achieve this, it is imperative that the various components of
the concept interoception are outlined so they become more
generally acknowledged as distinct, individual aspects which each
deserve their own specific labels, while at the same time there
remains a concept which integrates all of these aspects. That labels
are prone to change over time, that they di er between certain
research areas, and that there are individual di erences in the use
of these labels only makes an outline of this topic more relevant.
Although this review is not written on the pretense of being able
to create a universally accepted consensus on which labels to
use, it does intend to at least provide an impetus for the use of
distinct labels for the distinct aspects of interoception that will be
covered here. Moreover, this review emphasizes that it is every
author’s duty to introduce their own however short definition of
interoception for each individual publication, and to make sure it
matches with how they use the word throughout that publication.
HISTORY OF A CONCEPT
Etymology
To come to a deeper understanding of the meaning of a
word, or concept, it is customary to refer to its origins
and then address whether, and if so, how its meaning has
changed over time. Interoception is a relatively recent concept
which arose together with the concepts proprioception and
exteroception during the early 20th century. The first known
usage of the concept interoception in publication dates to
Sherrington (1906) in his book “The Integrative Action of
the Nervous System,” which is a collection of lectures he
had given at an unknown date prior to publication. In the
book, Sherrington talks of “interoceptors,” “interoceptive
receptor fields,” “interoceptive reflex arcs,” “interoceptive
surface,” and “interoceptive segments.” Interestingly, at this
point in time, the noun “interoception” itself was not yet
introduced in publication. In fact, it is only in the 1940s that
the word “interoception” first appears in scientific journals
(Freeman and Sharp, 1941; Mogendovich, 1941; Airapetyantz
and Bykov, 1945). Regardless, we do need to refer back to
Sherrington to understand the original meaning of the concept
interoception.
Sherrington referred to the internal surface of the body as
interoceptive, as opposed to exteroceptive which he defined as
the external surface in direct contact with the environment.
In this meaning interoceptive then can be considered a
synonym for things entoperipheral, while exteroceptive is
a synonym for things epiperipheral. Thus, according to
this definition, cutaneous sensations would be considered
exteroceptive sensations, but subcutaneous not. In the vast
entoperiphery, Sherrington further distinguished between deep
somatic tissue, i.e., skeletal muscle, as a site specific to
proprioceptors, and the viscera as site specific to interoceptors.
Furthermore, he considered not only perception of light, sound,
odor, and mechanical touch as exteroceptive, but also perception
of temperature and nociception. The inclusion of temperature
and nociception in the definition of exteroception, contrasts to
these sensations being included in more recent definitions of
interoception, such as the one put forward by Craig (2002). In
Sherrington’s (1906) definition, what distinguished interoception
(and proprioception) from exteroception is that only the latter
possesses the quality of projicience. Projicience is a term which
he used to refer to two aspects: (1) the perception of something at
a distance outside of our body (exogenous), and (2) projection
in the sense of estimating the future (precurrent) based on
what is happening now. In other words, Sherrington labeled
perception of precurrent exogenous stimuli as exteroceptive,
while sensations of endogenous origin as either proprioceptive
or interoceptive, depending on whether they arise in respectively
skeletal muscles or viscera.
While the linguistic contraction of “interior receptor” was
the basis for “interoceptor” and by extension the adjective
“interoceptive,” in contrast the noun “interoception” was first
introduced more than a third of a century later, and can either be
taken to be a variation of the contraction of “interior receptor,”
or to be a new contraction, namely “interior perception.”
Whatever, interoception’s original meaning, modern day use of
“interoception,” and to some extent “interoceptive” have generally
come to refer to the broader phenomenological perception, rather
than to refer merely to location and stimulation of receptors. In
other words the focus of the concept has shifted from referring
solely to the a erent relay of receptors of the ANS, to becoming a
word which is now most frequently used as an umbrella concept
for a multi-sensory, multimodal integrated percept of the body
state.
Semantic Evolution
In order to identify the frequency and evolution of usage
of specific interoception related labels, an extensive search
in Google Scholar was performed. The inclusion of selected
terms for which a frequency of occurrence was obtained,
was motivated by the idea that at some point in time all of
these included terms have had a nearly synonymous meaning
to one of our primary three search entries: interoceptor,
interoceptive, interoception. In addition to these three words,
the search entries included the following: visceroceptor,
visceroceptive, visceroception, somesthesis, somesthetic,
somesthesia, coenesthesis, coenesthetic, and coenesthesia. The
frequency of each of these words was established by identifying
the number of search results from 1800 up to and including
2010, with the “include patents” and “include citations” boxes
unchecked. The number of hits per word was assessed per
period of 5 years (1901 up to and including 1905, 1906–1910,
1911–1915, etc.), excepted the period from 1800 up to and
including 1900, a period which was taken as a whole.
Moreover, the same search procedure was conducted for
variations of each of these words to allow for identifying
possible changes in spelling preference over time and to
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identify the first introduction of alternate spellings. The authors
identified and conducted a separate search for alternate spellings,
which were: interoreceptor; interoreceptive, interoperceptive;
interoreception, interoperception; visceroreceptor; viscero-
receptive, visceroperceptive; visceroreception, visceroperception;
somaesthesis, somataesthesis, somatesthesis; somaesthetic,
somataesthetic, somatesthetic, somathestetic; someaesthesia,
somataesthesia, somatesthesia; caenesthesis, caenaesthesis,
coenaesthesis, coenoesthesis, cenesthesis, cenoesthesis; caen-
esthetic, caenaesthetic, coenaesthetic, coenoesthetic, cenesthetic,
cenoesthetic; caenesthesia, caenaesthesia, coenaesthesia, coeno-
esthesia, cenesthesia, cenoesthesia.
Because Google Scholar identifies and includes some alternate
spellings or concepts automatically in the search results it
produces, this could potentially create the problem of getting
wrong estimates. This problem was bypassed by entering
each individual search entry between brackets so only hits
for the specified spelling resulted. Another aspect taken into
consideration is that in Google Scholar, when the number of
results is higher than 10, the total number of hits as indicated
at the first page of search results is usually merely an initial
approximation by the Google Scholar search engine, but does
not always correspond exactly to the total number of hits.
The correct number of hits is indicated on the last page
of results (if the total is less than approximately 950 hits).
Therefore, in order to get a more accurate approximation of
the exact amount of hits, the total number of hits as indicated
on the last accessible page of results was used. For those
hits ranging over 1000 with 10 hits per page, Google Scholar
does not display pages beyond approximately the 95th page,
so approximations of the total number of hits when there
are more than approximately 950 results in total may be less
accurate.
Although it is beyond the scope of this review to present the
collected data in extensive detail, a selection has been made of
aspects which stand out and provide an interesting perspective
on the development of word preferences (see Table 1). During
the entire span of the 19th century, interoception was not yet
an existent word. Instead, with a total of 220 results for its
various spellings in that period, ‘coenesthesis’ was by far the most
popular word which comes closest to the inclusive meaning of
interoception, followed in popularity by ‘coenesthesia,’ which in
its various spellings totals only 11 results for that same period.
While ‘somesthesis’ and ‘somesthesia’ appear to be non-existent
in publication during the 19th century, the adjective ‘somesthetic’
did exist in publication starting around the late 1800s (totaling
five results up until 1900). Bailey (1906) was responsible for
introducing the word ‘somesthesis’ into the English language,
in the same year that Sherrington (1906) published the first
work to use the words ‘interoceptor’ and ‘interoceptive.’ Two
years later, it was again Bailey (1908) who first introduced the
word ‘somesthesia.’ About a century later, in the period from
2006 up to and including 2010, ‘somesthesis’ and ‘coenesthesia’
are still relatively popular nouns, with respectively 284 and 263
publications in which these words appear, but both are very much
overshadowed by the popularity of the noun ‘interoception’ with
mention in 1745 sources. It is true that in that 5 years period
from 2006 up to and including 2010, the adjective ‘somesthetic’
TABLE 1 | Word preferences over the centuries.
Year of first mention (author) Most popular time relative to
‘equivalent’ words
Publications from 2006–2010
Interoceptor Sherrington, 1906 1906–2010 202
Visceroceptor Strong and Elwyn, 1948 / 18
Interoceptive Sherrington, 1906 1981–2010 7471
Visceroceptive MacLean et al., 1952 / 170
Somesthetic
⇤Somaesthetic⇤
Taylor and Haughton, 1900
⇤Barker, 1897⇤
1897–1900;
1906–1910;
1916–1920;
1931–1980
1579
Coenesthetic
⇤Caenaesthetic⇤
Kellogg, 1901
⇤Noble, 1858⇤
1858;
1901–1915
194
Interoception Freeman and Sharp, 1941;
Mogendovich, 1941
2001–2010 1745
Visceroception
⇤Visceroreception⇤
Dutov, 1974
⇤Merkulova and Popova, 1967⇤
/ 103
Somesthesis Bailey, 1906 1936–1940;
1946–2000
284
Somesthesia Bailey, 1908 / 205
Coenesthesis
⇤Caenesthesis⇤
De Hájnik, 1816
⇤Hübner, 1794⇤
1794–1910 53
Coenesthesia de Nyir, 1817 1911–1935;
1941–1945
263
Time during which words were most popular is derived by the number of mention relative to ‘equivalent’ words. Such ‘equivalent’ words are grouped together between
two horizontal lines. For those words where the now most widely used spelling arose only later, alternative spellings are included and marked with an asterisk.
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also occurs in a large number of sources (1579 sources to be
precise), but this seems to be largely due to the use of the adjective
as a synonym for ‘somatosensory’ when referring to the CNS
areas SI and SII. Regardless of the reason for its popular use, the
occurrence of the adjective ‘somesthetic’ in recent years is still
by far outdone by the adjective ‘interoceptive,’ the latter which
occurred almost five times as much as the former, in a total of
7471 sources.
While it is obvious how this data set can provide insights
on the development of word usage, it may be unclear how it
can shed light on the development of word meaning over the
years, hence a clarification for the latter is in order. It has
already been pointed out that in their initial existence, the words
‘interoceptive’ and ‘interoception’ were more narrowly defined
concepts (Sherrington, 1906; see Etymology). Craig (2002) made
a plea to consider interoception as amore overarching term. Since
then that particular publication has been cited in well over 2000
other publications, and the usage of the word interoception has
spiked in popularity. If we then reconsider the collected word
prevalence data, it appears as if interoception is most frequently
used from the point in time onward when a broader meaning was
first attributed to it. The increase in popularity after this point
onward is in part due to at least two important factors. First, an
initial suggestion toward a conceptual shift likely leads to a lack
of consensus and thus increased mention and use of the word
in attempts to reach consensus, or in attempts to think through,
clarify and solidify its meaning. Secondly and most importantly,
concepts with broadmeanings have broader relevance to a variety
of research lines, whereas concepts with narrow meanings have
relevance to a more limited number of research areas. Following
this logic, we can assume that words increase in popularity at
least in part because their meanings shift to refer to a broader
concept. (However, we cannot conclude the reverse: that when
words decline in popularity, it is because their meanings have
narrowed down. It is possible for words to decline in popularity
simply because other words are attributed a similar meaning and
have become more popular.)
The arguments outlined here justify two choices made in this
review. First and most important, is that a choice has been made
to adopt and extend on the use of the word interoception in its
broad, overarching meaning, rather than try to revert back to
its originally restrictive meaning. I.e., this review builds on the
already existing conceptual change that has occurred after the
original inception of the words ‘interoceptive’ and ‘interoception’
last century. Secondly, given that currently interoception is the
most widely used word from all previously indexed, related
concepts, it justifies the choice for the title and focus of this
review to be on the words interoception and interoceptive to refer
to the broader perception of the body state, and to use related
definitions to more specifically classify sensations.
ASPECTS OF INTEROCEPTION
This review argues in favor of using the word interoception as an
overarching concept. We make a plea that anything which falls
within this larger concept, or which is related but di erent, ought
to be labeled di erently and more specifically. Doing so helps to
avoid confusion and allows for more e ective communication.
Whether there is consensus on the labels is only of secondary
importance, as meaning attributed to labels will naturally evolve
over time. Of primary importance is to establish a consensus that
each of the concepts listed below deserve their own labels and are
not to be confused with one another, even though they may be
related to one another.
Exogenous versus Endogenous Origins
If something has an exogenous origin, this means that the source
originates or is attributable to an agent outside the organism.
If something is endogenous, it means it comes from within the
organism and is not attributable to an external agent. It is clear
that ‘exogenous’ and ‘endogenous’ are antonyms of one another.
Likewise, exteroception is commonly accepted to be the antonym
of interoception. Therefore, how exteroception is defined, to
some extent a ects the meaning attributed to interoception. This
can be somewhat problematic, as there has been a conceptual
shift in the meaning of interoception, while the meaning of
exteroception has hardly changed for most who use it. The
resulting problem this poses for the definition of interoception
is twofold.
The first problem relates to the meaning attributed to
exteroception, namely that it is the sensory perception of
exogenous stimuli. This meaning is often interpreted to mean
that all sensations elicited by exogenous stimuli are exteroceptive,
and considers the actual stimulus origin of primary importance
and not the subjective perception arising in the CNS. This
approach implies that any experimental set-up that intends to
study interoception, would only be able to do so if sensations
would have an endogenous origin. This would largely preclude
the study of interoception and would have to discard many
of the published studies on the topic, as nearly every stimulus
applied in lab set-ups has an exogenous origin. In other
words, confounding exogenous and endogenous origins with the
phenomenological experience of something as relating to the
surrounding environment or to the body state, would seriously
set back the study of interoception, and conclusions made on the
topic of interoception. Furthermore, many naturally occurring
body state sensations are very frequently elicited by exogenous
stimuli. For example, gastro-intestinal sensations can follow the
ingestion of exogenous substances. Likewise, the sensation of
feeling cold is not necessarily of endogenous origin as in illness,
but can just as well have an actual exogenous cause such as a
cold ambient temperature. As the human body does not act in
isolation of its surroundings, it is necessary to keep concepts that
make a distinction between the origins of a stimulus (exogenous
versus endogenous) distinct from broader concepts that make a
distinction between di erent types of experiential perception as
arising in the CNS (interoception versus exteroception).
The second problem posed by referring to exteroception
as an antonym of interoception is that this often leads to
the assumption that the receptor systems and pathways for
both must by definition be mutually exclusive. However, that
is not necessarily the case when using the inclusive definition
of interoception. For example, seeing and feeling snow in the
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absence of cold sensations, can lead to the perception that the
perceived snow, although not imaginary, is not genuine snow.
This exteroceptive percept is the result from an integration of
various sensory modalities including body state sensations (as
well as past experience and other factors). If we imagine a
nearly identical scenario but accompanied by sensations typical
of physical illness, this can give a whole new phenomenological
feel to the absence of cold sensations, where this absence can
then be integrated in the interoceptive perception of the body
state rather than the exteroceptive perception of the surrounding
environment. This example, though hypothetical, illustrates that
exteroception and interoception can rely on identical sensory
receptors and a erent pathways, and that they need not be
mutually exclusive on any of the levels preceding the higher order
processing of interoception and exteroception.
The main point of this section is that sensory origin or
stimulus properties (exogenous versus endogenous) are not of
relevance to determining whether a percept is interoceptive
or exteroceptive when using the inclusive definition of
interoception. What matters in the inclusive definition is
whether a sensation is experienced as informative about the body
state or about the surroundings (see Interoception as Integrated
Percept). In those cases where the actual origin of a sensation is
considered of relevance for research purposes or conclusions,
rather than the phenomenological experience, it is preferable
to refer to the eliciting stimuli as exogenous or endogenous
(whichever is applicable), and give preference to the use of these
terms over ambiguous terminology.
Visceroceptor, Visceroceptive,
Visceroception – A Reference to Efferent
Innervation
Although not in popular usage yet (see Table 1), in this review
it is argued that there is a place for the words visceroceptor,
visceroceptive, and visceroception. These labels have become
more suitable to refer to the once restrictive concepts that
“interoceptor,” “interoceptive,” and “interoception” originally
referred to, i.e., things specifically and solely pertaining to the
viscera and nothing else (Sherrington, 1906). Such a distinction
is necessary as interoception has come to adopt a more
broad meaning, which refers to the integrated cross-modal
CNS perception of the body state (Craig, 2008; Critchley and
Harrison, 2013). Distinguishing between the broad concepts
“interoceptive,” and “interoception” on the one hand, and
the narrow concepts “visceroceptive” and “visceroception” on
the other, helps to avoid all possible confusion between the
broad and the specific. Moreover, given the broad meaning of
interoception, it can be argued that any receptor that can provide
information to create a CNS representation of the body state
can be considered an interoceptor, and not just those receptors
in the viscera. This makes the word interoceptor so inclusive
it becomes redundant (“receptor” would be su cient). At the
same time this necessitates the use of a more specific label
for referring to only those receptors located in visceral tissue.
Hence, it is proposed here to refer to these visceral receptors
as “visceroceptors” rather than “interoceptors.” In the same
vein the adjective “interoceptive” and the noun “interoception”
should be solely reserved for more broad meanings pertaining
to perception of the body state when further details are not
necessary or when the focus is on generalities. In contrast,
the adjective “visceroceptive” and the noun “visceroception” are
encouraged to be used when referring specifically to visceral
tissue origins, distinct from and not including somatic tissue
origins.
Of course, it is crucial then that there is understanding of what
viscera are, because, as is the case with the word interoception,
there is more than one definition. We can recognize at least
three types of definition: (1) one arbitrarily grouping certain
anatomical structures under the label viscera, (2) another based
on e erent innervation, and (3) a final one focusing on perceptual
di erences.
The Dictionary Definition
One definition used for distinguishing viscera from somatic
tissue creates this divide as based on anatomical location, and
is commonly found in dictionaries; it either labels (a) only
the intestines, or either (b) all intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal,
and intra-pelvic organs as viscera (Berube et al., 2008). The
problem with considering only the intestines, i.e., the part
below the stomach as viscera, is that the stomach and organs
located in the thorax can then neither be considered visceral,
nor somatic – yet no other label is provided for these “gray
zone” body tissues. As for the anatomy based definition which
considers all intra-abdominal and intra-thoracic organs to be
viscera, it simply classifies the remainder of the body as somatic
tissue. That is: not only skin and skeletal muscles, but also
joints and bones (Lewis, 1938). This is usually accompanied by
a further arbitrary subdivision of somatic tissue distinguishing
the skin from the remaining “deep” somatic tissue. Whether,
the circulatory system is visceral or somatic according to any
such anatomical definition usually remains unmentioned, as
the circulatory system branches out into all areas of the body,
making it di cult to classify based on its location. Also, if viscera
are strictly those organs located in the trunk, then the female
reproductive system should be considered to be entirely visceral,
whereas at least part of the male equivalent (in addition to the
dermis) should be considered somatic. As no such claims are
made by anyone, this implies that the anatomy based definition
as given is not strictly adhered to even by its proponents, and
that the dictionary definition is not su cient by itself to classify
tissues. For better communication, it is considered preferable
to use definitions which do not leave any room for subjective
interpretation and which do not require additional, implicit,
unmentioned criteria.
Definition as Based on Efferent Innervation
In contrast to the aforementioned dictionary definition, there
exists a very straightforward, clear-cut physiology based
definition that makes the distinction between visceral and
somatic tissue as based on actual e erent innervation (Wolfsohn,
1914). Relying on existing knowledge of e erent SNS innervation
and ANS innervation to determine which tissues are respectively
somatic and which ones visceral, deserves preference for two
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reasons.1 First, it does not leave a single tissue of the entire
body unmentioned, and would classify the circulatory system
as visceral (Livingston, 1935). Second, it does not leave room
for arbitrary individual choices on which organic tissues to
include under the label viscera, and which ones not, because
physiologically verifiable, existent e erent innervation cannot be
contested.
Note should be taken that making the distinction as based
on e erent innervation di ers on some important aspects from
those who simply label all organs in the trunk as viscera and
consider the remainder of the body as somatic. First, when
basing ourselves on e erent innervation, we can determine that
the skeletal system is in fact to be labeled as visceral, and not
somatic (Kini and Nandeesh, 2012). One implication of this is
that bone pain thus is to be considered a visceral, and not a
somatic pain according to innervation. Another implication is
that, in so far that sensory feedback from the skeletal system
(including periosteum) contributes at all to proprioception, this
would then be a visceral component contributing to the CNS
representation of the body in space (proprioception), which
is perfectly possible if we adhere to inclusive definitions of
proprioception, interoception and exteroception, where all that
matters is the phenomenological experience and not which type
of receptors are involved in creating that experience.
Other di erences between the dictionary definition and the
e erent based definition for distinguishing somatic from visceral
tissue relates to the classification of the skin, the esophagus,
and the respiratory system. If we consult known information
on e erent innervation, we can conclude the skin is in fact
not a purely somatic tissue in contrast to what is often stated
(Oaklander and Siegel, 2005; Gibbins, 2013). The skin actually
contains both SNS as well as ANS innervation, making it a
partially somatic, partially visceral organ. In psychophysiology
this visceral aspect is well-recognized, where dermal autonomous
changes such as changes in pilo-erection and sweat secretion
can be and are used to assess physiological aspects of emotion
(Dawson et al., 2007; Benedek and Kaernbach, 2011).
Like the skin, the esophagus is a single functional unit, yet
its proximal section has SNS innervation, whereas the distal
section has ANS innervation, also making the esophagus an
organ which is partially somatic, and partially visceral. Unlike
the skin, the esophagus has a clear division between the visceral
and somatic parts. Also included in this list of mixed SNS and
ANS innervation, although not strictly speaking an organ, is the
respiratory system (Kuntz, 1944).
All three of the aforementioned – the skin, the esophagus,
and the respiratory system – have a prominent role in the
interoception literature and related research. Craig was the first
to argue that some tactile sensations, such as sensual touch,
are distinct from other touch sensations and are relayed to the
brain together with other homeostatic sensations (Craig, 2002).
While Craig based his argument on a erent innervation (see
The Homeostatic A erent Pathways and Early CNS Processing of
1Although, the authors of this review recognize that the enteric nervous system
(ENS) has its own reflex activity independent from the ANS, both ANS and
ENS innervated tissue are classified here under the label “visceral” as opposed to
“somatic.”
Homeostasis), this review makes the distinction between visceral
and somatic based on e erent innervation, and uses another
label for a erent based di erences. The esophagus too is gaining
increased attention in interoception research, as it allows to
distinguish between visceroception (if stimulated distally, i.e., the
lower part) and somatoception (if stimulated proximally, i.e., the
upper part; Aziz et al., 2000; Ceunen et al., 2015). As for the
respiratory system, since early human experience it has been the
gateway to altering and gaining control over ANS function and
thus control over the viscera (Sovik, 1999). In fact, one of the
first written records where breathing is considered to be able to
a ect the viscera, is in a book by Tao Hongjing, written sometime
around the end of the 5th or start of the 6th century, where
six di erent methods of breathing are considered beneficial to
the health and functioning of six di erent viscera (Zhang et al.,
2007). Because respiration can be used to increase the inotropic
output of heart rate (Shannaho -Khalsa and Kennedy, 1993),
which in turn increases heartbeat perception accuracy (Herbert
et al., 2012a), respiration may even be considered to be a gateway
for altering heartbeat perception and perhaps also for altering
other forms of visceroception.
Definition as Based on “Typical” Sensory Properties
A final note on methods for distinguishing between somatic
and visceral tissues concerns sensory properties. The viscera are
often attributed three typical sensory properties that are thought
to distinguish them from somatic tissue. These three visceral
properties are said to be (1) the inability to volitionally bring
visceral sensations into awareness, (2) poor discrimination of
sensations, and (3) poor localization (Ray and Neill, 1947; Aziz
et al., 2000; Dunckley et al., 2005; Dworkin, 2007). Each of these
points will be addressed here.
As to the first point, although visceral sensations generally
only enter awareness bottom–up (e.g., when homeostasis is
disrupted, or in mental disorders), it is actually possible to
volitionally attend in a top–down method to visceral sensations
as is done in meditative practices. Even though such increased
awareness does not necessarily imply increased accuracy (Khalsa
et al., 2008; Ceunen et al., 2013a), nevertheless it is possible to
volitionally attend to visceral sensations, which underscores that
the first property associated with visceral sensations is not correct.
The second sensory property often associated with viscera,
namely poor discrimination, i.e., poor perceptual accuracy, is
indeed very common to most ANS innervated organs, yet not
universally applicable to all. For example, there are subgroups
of individuals who can very accurately perceive their heartbeat.
One may argue such accurate heartbeat perception is possible
due to heartbeats resonating in somatic muscle tissue overlying
the heart region, thus implying there is not su cient evidence
for the existence of accurate visceroception. However, even when
sensations from overlying somatic tissues are absent, accurate
heartbeat detection is still possible (Khalsa et al., 2009), which
indicates that good discrimination is possible even for at least one
type of visceroception, and perhaps also for other types.
As for poor localization, it is true that the majority of visceral
sensations are phenomenologically experienced as vague, di use,
or pertaining to a general area, rather than to a precise spot.
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However, from an experience level, pain stemming from kidneys,
appendix, genitalia, and anus all have known instances where
these were subjectively experienced as sharp, and/or in a clearly
localized way (Boyle, 1997; Bajwa et al., 2001; Kafkia et al., 2011;
Sejdinovic et al., 2011; Sandella et al., 2012; Fauconnier et al.,
2013), although none of these pains stem from tissues innervated
by SNS e erents. Moreover, tactile sensations including itch,
sensual touch and temperature can be fairly accurately localized.
Taking into consideration that the skin is partly ANS innervated,
this is yet another example which questions whether all visceral
sensations are indeed poorly localized. Furthermore, note should
be taken that not all somatic tissue sensations are characterized by
accurate localization either (Lewis, 1938; Feinstein et al., 1954).
Implications
One practical implication is that, when classifying body tissues
as either somatic or visceral, it is suggested here not to combine
classification as based on sensory properties with classification
as based on e erents: this is simply not completely accurate and
is confusing to the critical reader. An example of one such to
be avoided, confusing statement would be: “we consider this
organ as visceral BECAUSE it is ANS innervated and BECAUSE
its sensations are poorly localized.” Instead, it would be better
to say: “We consider this organ as visceral because it is ANS
innervated. Sensations from most, but not all ANS innervated
organs, including/excepted this one, are poorly localized.” When
sensory properties are considered truly relevant to specific
research conclusions or predictions, distinguishing viscera with
sensory properties typical to most viscera, from other viscera
with anomalous sensory properties may definitely have its value.
E.g., one could make the distinction between those typical ANS
innervated organs that are always poorly discriminated and/or
poorly localized, as opposed to those few ANS innervated organs
which can at times be accurately discriminated and/or accurately
localized. (Accurate discrimination refers to heartbeat detection
through visceral a erents only; accurate localization, albeit not
always, refers to kidneys, appendix, genitals, anus, and the tactile
sensations – the latter being included because the skin is partly
ANS innervated.)
In practical, research oriented terms, this section clarifies how
to classify stimuli as either visceral or somatic in such a way
that if others apply the same method of classification, they will
make exactly the same conclusions as to which body tissues
are visceral and which are somatic. Moreover, this section also
implies that stimulation of certain organs or systems can elicit
sensations which are a combination of both visceral and somatic
components. For example, respiratory stimuli such as loaded
breathing (i.e., breathing against a resistance) and CO2 inhalation
have as visceral component the sensory feedback from the lungs
and the CO2 levels in the circulatory system, while the somatic
component is the sensory feedback from the respiratory muscles
(Epstein et al., 1995). Likewise, cold pain as induced by the
cold pressor test (a test where subjects are required to submerge
their hand in cold water), is not a purely somatic stimulus as is
often suggested by those who interchange the terms “somatic,”
“exteroceptive,” and “exogenous” as synonyms. Immerging the
hand in cold water in fact a ects visceral tissue in addition to
somatic tissue. It does so through the baroreflex which involves
the (visceral) circulatory system, but also because the skin is an
organ with both visceral and somatic components, rather than
being purely somatic. Moreover the cold penetrates beyond the
skin, not only into the somatic muscle tissue beneath the skin,
but potentially penetrating as deep as into the bones, for which
there even is an English expression, namely “being cold/chilled
to the bone.” Even without being literally cold to the bone, cold
pain as induced by the cold pressor test has been known to
have been subjectively perceived as radiating from the submerged
hand all along the veins across the entire lower arm, as reported
by participants in an earlier study of the authors (Ceunen et al.,
2013b). Such subjective experience of ‘spreading’ cold suggests
that pain induced by the cold pressor is at least partly dependent
on visceral sensory feedback stemming from the circulatory
system, as described by Livingston (1935).
The most important implication of this section for research
purposes, is that under natural circumstances visceral sensations
are frequently accompanied by somatic sensations as is the case
for heartbeats, and possibly also for ingestion of large amounts
of food. Therefore, it is imperative that before designing an
experiment, the researcher determines whether it is absolutely
crucial to elicit visceral sensations without eliciting any somatic
sensations whatsoever, or whether ecological validity is more
important. If the aim is merely to elicit a sensation that
resembles a real life sensation as close as possible, it may not be
necessary to come up with elaborate, time consuming or other
e ortful investments intended to annihilate any possible somatic
sensation from co-occurring with a visceral sensation. Moreover,
these contraptions intended to block out somatic sensations can
create other (albeit constant) variables into an experimental set-
up, a ecting the outcomes of a study just as much, but merely in a
di erent way than when such ‘precautions’ would not have been
taken.
Overview of “Visceroceptor, Visceroceptive,
Visceroception – A Reference to Efferent Innervation”
In summary, this section argues in favor of labeling visceral
and somatic sensations specifically when needed, rather
than invariably lumping them under the more generalized
terms interoception and exteroception, and it also argues
that interoception and exteroception are not synonyms for
respectively visceral and somatic. Although, it is true that
sensations arising from viscera are most often contributing
to the phenomenological interoceptive percept, in certain
instances visceral sensations can potentially contribute to the
phenomenological exteroceptive percept of what is going on in
the environment around us. It was further argued that viscera
are preferentially to be defined as those organs with e erent
ANS innervation, while somatic tissues are to be defined as
body tissues with e erent SNS innervation. It has been brought
to the reader’s attention that some organs such as skin and
esophagus, or functional units such as the respiratory system
have a combination of both types of innervation. Furthermore,
although poor discrimination and poor localization are common
to most ANS innervated organs, it is inaccurate to conclude that
an organ must be somatic simply because sensations thereof
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can be accurately perceived and/or well-localized. In other
words, it is incorrect to state that poor localization and poor
discrimination are a universally defining characteristic that allow
to determine whether an organ is to be considered ANS or SNS
innervated. Using e erent innervation to guide our definition
allows for physiologically based conformity across researchers
in determining which kind of sensations are to be considered
visceral, which ones somatic, and which ones a combination
of both. Also of note is that in designing experiments where
ecological validity is the aim, attempts at creating ‘purely’ visceral
sensations may not even be necessary, although these may be
informative.
The Homeostatic Afferent Pathways and
Early CNS Processing of Homeostasis
When Bud Craig redefined interoception as the sense of
physiological status of all tissues of the body, he specified this
“sense” as being a CNS representation, while at the same time
arguing that this representation starts at the receptor site and is
relayed via what he labeled as the homeostatic pathway (Craig,
2002). While Craig labels both the relay of the homeostatic
state of the body (from receptor site up to primary levels of
processing) and higher order levels of processing as interoceptive,
we prefer to use two di erent labels to distinguish these two
aspects. Specifically, we would reserve interoception to refer
to the higher order processing, which occurs once the mid-
insula gets involved (see Interoception as Integrated Percept).
The process from receptor site up to primary areas of processing
are labeled here as homeostatic pathways (see The Homeostatic
A erent Pathways and Early CNS Processing of Homeostasis).
Take note that there is not just one homeostatic pathway, but
instead there are at least three to five (Critchley and Harrison,
2013) depending on how one counts, as will be outlined in the
paragraphs immediately hereafter.
The spinal homeostatic pathway refers to all processes as
illustrated in Figure 1, prior to mid insula involvement (Craig,
2010). It starts with stimulation of Add and/or C-fiber receptors,
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of spinal homeostatic and
non-homeostatic afferent pathways as based on (Craig, 2010). PAG,
periaqueductal gray; PB, parabrachial nucleus; NTS, nucleus tractus solitarii
a.k.a. nucleus of the solitary tract; dpIns, dorsal posterior insula; SI, primary
somatosensory cortex.
is relayed via the first (and also the second and fifth) lamina of the
dorsal horn of the spinal cord, on to the brainstem homeostatic
regions which form a pre-cortical homeostatic representation,
and then to the posterior, basal and medial thalamic nuclei.
Finally there is activation of the primary sensory processing area
for homeostatic sensory input, namely the dorsal posterior insula.
This spinal homeostatic pathway is distinct from the spinal relay
of non-homeostatic sensory information, which is schematically
depicted on the right hand side of Figure 1, and of which
discussion in further detail is beyond the purpose of this review.
Other than (1) the spinal homeostatic pathway, there are
also other routes via which primary homeostatic processing can
occur (Critchley and Harrison, 2013). There is the (2) cranial
homeostatic pathway. It is that of the cranial nerves, such as
vagus and glossopharyngeal nerves carrying information from
the receptor sites to the brainstem – first to the NTS, and then
on to the parabrachial nucleus (PB) and periaqueductal gray
matter (PAG) – and from there on to thalamus, hypothalamus,
amygdala, and ultimately to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
and the insula. It may be of interest to note here that taste – often
categorized as one of the distinctly non-interoceptive sensations –
is in fact relayed via cranial nerve a erents (Craig, 2005).
Then there is also (3) the humoral homeostatic pathway,
which reaches the CNS via circulating substances. The humoral
pathway refers in fact to at least three di erent pathways of
information transduction, which all share the commonality that
they are in first instance activated via circulating substances. The
(a) ventricular (or classical) humoral pathway detects changes
in substances present in the third and fourth ventricles, and
first engages the circumventricular organs which are located
adjacent to these ventricles; these include the area postrema
(AP), the organum vasculosum of lamina terminalea (OVLT),
and the subfornical organ (SFO). The humoral info processed
here in turn projects to the NTS, the hypothalamus, the PB,
sympathetic medullary nuclei, the dorsal motor nucleus, the
nucleus ambiguous, midline thalamic nuclei, and again the
insula and ACC. The (b) blood–brain (or non-classical) humoral
pathway is that which detects changes in those substances passing
the blood–brain barrier. It involves the NTS, hypothalamic
nuclei, the medial amygdala nucleus, and monoamine systems,
and can influence the information relay between ventral striatum,
insula, and cingulate. The (c) microglial (or extraneuronal)
humoral pathway is that in which the microglia in the
circumventricular organs, leptomeninges and choroid plexus
respond to peripheral presence of pathogens and inflammation.
The changes taking place in these microglia in response to
these signs of infection and tissue damage activate a cascade of
microglial activation across the CNS.
Interoception as Integrated Percept
Although, the spinal, cranial, and humoral homeostatic pathways
are the most direct routes of sensory feedback concerning the
status of all tissues and the state of the body, they are not
exclusive contributors to the highest order percept of the body
status. In constructing a central, higher order representation
of the body status (i.e., interoception) the CNS relies on all
available information, which it integrates in the mid insula
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FIGURE 2 | The neurophysiology of interoception. Schematic simplification of the neurophysiology behind the cross-modal integrated (re)representation of the
body status, otherwise known as interoception. Adapted from Craig (2008).
(Craig, 2008). Other than homeostatic feedback relayed from
the dorsal posterior insula (or primary interoceptive cortex) to
the mid insula, the mid insula also receives input from the
secondary somatosensory cortex, thus e ectively allowing for
the integration of spinal non-homeostatic a erent information
(see Figure 1) in the interoceptive percept. In addition, also
visual, auditory and vestibular feedback are integrated at the
mid insula (Craig, 2008). The mid insula further communicates
with and integrates information from the amygdala regarding
stimulus salience and emotional memories, as well as with the
hypothalamus regarding current state of the ANS and of ongoing
metabolic processes (see Figure 2, adapted from Craig, 2008).
Thus, the mid insula is considered to be the locus responsible
for the integrated re-representation, feature extraction and cross-
modality integration, i.e., the core structure needed for what can
be considered interoception (Craig, 2010). When this integrated
re-representation is relayed to the right anterior insula where also
subjective time perception is processed, interoception enters the
realm of apperception, i.e., conscious interoception. As can be
seen in Figure 2 from the presence of reciprocal connections
represented by two-way arrows, as well as is indirectly evident
from section 2.2.3, arriving at this higher order integrated percept
involving the mid insula and the anterior insula, is in fact
not an entirely sequential hierarchical process (Critchley and
Harrison, 2013). Although there is a posterior-to-mid-to-anterior
processing in the insula, there is also a lot of cross-talk between
many of the “lower” areas with one another as well as cross-talk
from these areas from and to the mid insula and the anterior
insula. As such, interoception is in fact the sum total of all
structures involved in addition to activation of mid and anterior
insula – it is the product of a neural matrix for body state
perception (Craig, 2005; Legrain et al., 2011; Moseley et al., 2012;
Critchley and Harrison, 2013).
Examples from the subjective perception of body state will
be given here and in paragraphs immediately following this
one, to illustrate the part that each of the sensory inputs as
illustrated in Figure 2, contribute to interoception. In Figure 2,
we can see that somatic sensations relayed via the secondary
somatosensory cortex can potentially contribute to interoception.
Although, the ability to accurately perceive heartbeats does not
necessarily require a erent feedback from somatic tissue (Khalsa
et al., 2009), in cases were such a erents are involved, there is
activation of somatosensory areas, which results from sensations
relayed via the spinal non-homeostatic pathway (see Figure 1). It
is likely that such clear somatic sensations are most commonwith
inotropic activation of the heart, as manipulations that increase
inotropic output, also increase cardioceptive accuracy (Herbert
et al., 2012a).
As seen in Figure 2, vision can play a significant role in
interoception. This contrasts to popular views, wherein vision
is generally considered to be a sensory faculty which solely
contributes to the perception of the surrounding environment.
An example where a visual experience is part of interoception
is the gray-out that often occurs shortly before the onset of
syncope. For the individual, subjectively this gray-out is part
of the cascade of sensations of the fainting experience and of
the percept that the homeostatic status of the body is disrupted
(Kamiya et al., 2005; Shukla and Zimetbaum, 2006). Another
well-accepted finding that supports and illustrates the notion that
vision can in fact contribute to the perception of the body status
comes from satiety research, in which visual feedback has long
been recognized as one of the factors a ecting food intake, a
basic homeostatic function crucial for survival (Berthoud, 2006;
Morton et al., 2006; Cornier et al., 2007). Moreover, visual
feedback also a ects the experience of acute pain and phantom
limb pain (Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996;
Chan et al., 2007; Mancini et al., 2011), which further underscores
that vision has the potential to contribute to the perception of the
own body state. Even the sight of facial expressions of others can
a ect processing of information about the own body state – at
least for pain (Mailhot et al., 2012; Khatibi et al., 2014; Wieser
et al., 2014).
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Not only vision has the potential to contribute to
interoception. Auditory information or the disruption or absence
thereof can just as much contribute to the phenomenological
interoceptive percept. The most obvious example is tinnitus,
which can indicate either the onset of syncope, inner ear damage,
or which can be part of a set of symptoms which indicate some
sort of homeostatic disruption (McGuinness and Harris, 1961;
Bitterman, 2004; König et al., 2006; Shukla and Zimetbaum, 2006;
Nam et al., 2010). Tinnitus also includes instances of actually
hearing one’s own heartbeat, which is referred to as pulsatile
tinnitus and which can go together with high blood pressure or
other circulatory abnormalities (Mattox and Hudgins, 2008).
Of course not all forms of pulsatile tinnitus correspond to the
heart-rate, e.g., when pulsing is caused by spasms of ear muscles,
but even then the pulsatile tinnitus reflects a physiological
abnormality, i.e., deviation from the homeostatic state of the
body. Moreover, verbal information can also alter perception of
the body state and a ect it, for example under social stress or
during hypnosis (Darwin, 1872; Drummond et al., 2003; Tan
et al., 2005). All these are mere examples which indicate auditory
feedback can and does at times contribute to the perception of
the body state.
As for the potential of vestibular sensory information adding
to interoception, many may have experienced it as the feeling
of dizziness or vertigo which sometimes accompanies physical
illness and therefore can be indicative of it. From all these
examples, it should be clear that really any type of sensory
information, and not merely that from homeostatic pathways can
get integrated into the overall body percept. It is only because of
this integration of sensory input that biofeedback is possible in
the first place and can help in the treatment of many psychiatric
disorders in which interoception plays a major role (Schoenberg
and David, 2014). Of course the selection of examples listed here
are by no means exhaustive of how non-homeostatic sensory
information can contribute to interoception: they merely serve
as illustrations of how multisensory interoception truly is.
Note also that interoception is defined as a cross-modal
integrated representation of the body status, rather than merely
a multisensory representation. It is cross-modal because this
phenomenological experience of the body status not only
integrates input from a variety of peripheral sensory channels, but
also integrates information from, and cross-talks with di erent
structures within the CNS as can be seen in Figure 2. Much of the
information relayed via the sense organs which gets integrated
in the interoceptive percept, can only be integrated because
learning provides the opportunity to identify these percepts as
informative on the body state. This learned integration can be
e ected via conditioning or other forms of learning (e.g., Pappens
et al., 2013; Bevins and Besheer, 2014). Seth (2013) proposes
that interoception, or interoceptive inference as he labels it, is
not just passive, bottom–up processing, but is something which
also involves active top–down activation to make predictions
of the causes of sensory input. His view is based on the
central idea of predictive coding, which is that perception is a
process of not only a erent feedback, but also of predictions,
and ultimately the integration of both, resulting in prediction
errors. Predictive coding models also consider MUS as arising
from not only peripheral sensory feedback, but also from prior
beliefs, where attention, attributed agency, expectation, prior
experience and even cultural beliefs all play a role in perception of
symptoms (Edwards et al., 2012). This is clear for example from
the e ect of instruction in decreasing (placebo) or increasing
(nocebo) visceral pain intensity (Schmid et al., 2013). More
support for the argument made here, is that interoception can be
manipulated by something as simple as categorizing interoceptive
sensations versus rating those same sensations on a continuous
dimension (Petersen et al., 2014). The change in interoception
with this sort of experimental manipulation is likely e ected via
a mechanism of biasing perceptual decision making, as shown
extensively in categorization research involving exteroception.
Further supporting the argument of CNS involvement in body
state perception are corollary discharge models of e ort, which
hold that the perception of physical exertion is entirely centrally
generated, rather than resultant from somatic a erents (Marcora,
2009). Taken together, we should at least consider the possibility
that body state perception other than perception of e ort may
also be in part centrally generated.
It has been suggested by Paulus and Stein (2010) that
with increased ambiguous or noisy sensory input from the
homeostatic pathways and decreased accuracy of perception,
the brain relies especially on itself (as well as on alternative
sensory channels) enhancing top–down modulation and creating
a self-referential biased percept of what is going on with the
body. Whether, individuals with somatoform disorders, mood
disorders and anxiety disorders are less or more visceroceptively
accurate is hard to conclude given opposing research findings.
That people with these disorders are not entirely homogenous
with regard to their ability for heartbeat detection, can be
related to findings from McGrath et al. (2013). Their findings
suggest that at least for major depression, and perhaps for
mood and other disorders, there are two subgroups of patients:
one group consists of individuals with an overactive anterior
insula, and the other of individuals with an underactive
anterior insula. These two distinct neurological biomarker
patterns of these two subgroups are suggestive respectively of
accurate and inaccurate perceivers. This would explain why
findings regarding cardioceptive accuracy in the aforementioned
disorders are contradictory. Regardless of the accuracy with
which individuals with mood and anxiety disorders can perceive
sensory homeostatic a erent feedback, individuals with such
disorders excessively rely on sources other than actual bottom–
up homeostatic pathways, giving more weight to maladaptive
cognitive-emotional schemes of interpretation (Paulus and Stein,
2010). All of the aforementioned further contributes to the view
that the perception of the body state, i.e., interoception, is a truly
multimodal percept.
CONCLUSION
Although, Sherrington (1906) originally came up with and used
the label interoceptive as a synonym for things visceral, over
the course of time, interoception has come to mean much more
than just that. While interoception is sometimes referred to
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as viscerosensory integration (Critchley and Harrison, 2013),
interoception is more than the central sensory integration of
a erents stemming from only the viscera. Interoception has in
fact come to refer to a multimodal integration not restricted to
any sensory channel, not restricted to mere sensations, but also
relying on learned associations, memories, and emotions and
integrating these in the total experience which is the subjective
representation of the body state. Interoception defined as such
includes any form of pain, not just visceral pain, but somatic pain
as well.
This inclusive definition of interoception is not new. Rather,
this review expands on this view and the formerly made
association with the inclusion of pain in this definition. It is
guided by the most commonly accepted definition of pain to
serve as inspiration for the definition of interoception. Pain
is defined as based on its phenomenological experience rather
than referring to the physical origin of the pain sensation or
any physiologically objectively quantifiable aspect (Merskey and
Bogduk, 1994). The IASP considers pain to be a psychological
state, and although it recognizes that pain often has a proximate
physical cause such as a noxious agent activating nociceptors and
nociceptive pathways, it emphasizes that this need not always be
the case, and that therefore the presence or absence of a noxious
stimulus is not relevantin determining whether there is pain or
not, and neither is the activation of nociceptors or nociceptive
pathways.
Like this definition of pain then, so too has “interoception”
become such a broad concept that it has been argued here that
interoception should be defined as a subjective experience of
the body state. Although in many instances, this experience
may well be elicited by a peripheral change in homeostasis,
this need not necessarily always be so. Independent of the
phenomenological experience which is interoception, aspects
potentially contributing to interoception can be classified in
myriad ways. One way is to consider whether sensations
have an endogenous or exogenous origin. Whatever, the
actual source of a sensation, endogenous or exogenous, it
does not determine whether a perceived sensation is to be
considered interoceptive or not. The only thing determining
whether something is interoceptive is whether it contributes
to the subjective perception of body state. The same can be
said of the distinction between somatic tissue and viscera.
Although it is often relevant to distinguish visceral from somatic
tissue, it does not mean sensations stemming from somatic
tissue cannot contribute to the phenomenological percept of
the status of the body. To avoid confusion between visceral
sensations on the one hand, and the subjective feeling state
that is interoception on the other, it is suggested in this
review to not use these two related but distinct concepts
as synonyms. In particular, it is preferable to keep words
which contain a direct linguistic reference to viscera (e.g.,
viscerosensory, visceroceptive, visceroceptor, visceroception)
reserved for instances where the distinction between ANS/ENS
e erent innervated tissue on the one hand and SNS innervated
tissue on the other is of equal or more relevance than the
sum phenomenological experience of the general state of the
body.
Homeostatic pathways (including early CNS homeostatic
processing) have also been discussed in this review, and are
considered to provide the most direct sensory feedback on
the state of the body. The authors prefers to label these as
homeostatic rather than interoceptive pathways, and only speak
of interoception from the point in processing onward where
there is a higher order integration of information, sensory
and neural, taking place to form a body state representation
in the CNS. Thus, the “-ception” in “interoception” is
taken to no longer refer to “reception” (i.e., receiving) of
stimulation, but rather the CNS “perception” of the body state.
Perception itself is always an inherently flawed and subjective
reconstruction of reality by the CNS, never an accurate one-
to-one representation. Hence, the core of the definition of
interoception is on the subjective experience above all else; thus
we can say the brain is the true source, i.e., the real origin of
interoception.
In summary, in this review we have critically examined the
origin of interoception in two major ways, and conclude with
a statement on that which we argues is the true origin of
interoception. In first instance, (1) the etymological origin of
the word interoception has been investigated, and in extension
thereof its semantic development too. This approach, apart
from clarifying why there is a lack of consensus, has provided
the ground from which we were able to logically distill the
various components related to and contributing to interoception.
Each of these various components has at one point been
considered to be (2) the physical origin of interoception: some
considered the stimulus the origin of interoception (endogenous
versus exogenous), other the organs involved (viscera versus
somatic tissue), still others the homeostatic pathways through
which the signals are transmitted. Although these may all
contribute to interoception and a ect our experience, none
of these are essential to interoception, because it is in fact
the CNS, where perception is created, and so it is inside our
heads that we may find the very origin of our interoceptive
experience.
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